[Buildroot] [git commit] hostapd: bump to version 2.5

Peter Korsgaard peter at korsgaard.com
Tue Sep 29 22:24:43 UTC 2015


commit: http://git.buildroot.net/buildroot/commit/?id=1639a7ebfa99f5b52dc7d2d8db94d826f4bac35f
branch: http://git.buildroot.net/buildroot/commit/?id=refs/heads/master

Remove upstream patches.

Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch at tkos.co.il>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter at korsgaard.com>
---
 ...Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch |   50 -------
 ...integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch |   42 ------
 package/hostapd/0003-EAP-pwd-fixes.patch           |  154 --------------------
 package/hostapd/hostapd.hash                       |    2 +-
 package/hostapd/hostapd.mk                         |    2 +-
 5 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 248 deletions(-)

diff --git a/package/hostapd/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch b/package/hostapd/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d9dccf9..0000000
--- a/package/hostapd/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
-Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser
-
-strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and
-resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could
-result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length
-argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault.
-
-This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that
-has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This
-would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with
-upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER
-(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used).
-
-Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to
-rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be
-larger than the maximum configured body length.
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
-Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch at tkos.co.il>
----
- src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c
-index 2f08f37275c0..d2855e32fd0f 100644
---- a/src/wps/httpread.c
-+++ b/src/wps/httpread.c
-@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
- 					if (!isxdigit(*cbp))
- 						goto bad;
- 					h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16);
-+					if (h->chunk_size < 0 ||
-+					    h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) {
-+						wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+							   "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d",
-+							   h->chunk_size);
-+						goto bad;
-+					}
- 					/* throw away chunk header
- 					 * so we have only real data
- 					 */
--- 
-2.1.4
-
diff --git a/package/hostapd/0002-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch b/package/hostapd/0002-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 307297b..0000000
--- a/package/hostapd/0002-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
-Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser
-
-The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the
-length of the information elements (int left) could end up being
-negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack
-buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing
-so, resulting in segmentation fault.
-
-This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service
-attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses
-hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based
-drivers).
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
-Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch at tkos.co.il>
----
- src/ap/wmm.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/ap/wmm.c b/src/ap/wmm.c
-index 6d4177c2a847..314e244bc956 100644
---- a/src/ap/wmm.c
-+++ b/src/ap/wmm.c
-@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ void hostapd_wmm_action(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
- 		return;
- 	}
- 
-+	if (left < 0)
-+		return; /* not a valid WMM Action frame */
-+
- 	/* extract the tspec info element */
- 	if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, left, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) {
- 		hostapd_logger(hapd, mgmt->sa, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,
--- 
-2.1.4
-
diff --git a/package/hostapd/0003-EAP-pwd-fixes.patch b/package/hostapd/0003-EAP-pwd-fixes.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 16a1f53..0000000
--- a/package/hostapd/0003-EAP-pwd-fixes.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
-This patch combines the following upstream security fixes:
-
-28a069a545b0 EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior
-3035cc2894e0 EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment reassembly
-477c74395acd EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment reassembly
-e28a58be2618 EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit and Confirm
-dd2f043c9c43 EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit and Confirm
-
-Details at 
-http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/eap-pwd-missing-payload-length-validation.txt
-
-Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch at tkos.co.il>
----
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-index f2b092669a42..e58b13a42f73 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- 	BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
- 	u16 offset;
- 	u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
-+	size_t prime_len, order_len;
-+
-+	if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) {
-+		ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
-+
-+	prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
-+	order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
-+
-+	if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+			   (unsigned int) payload_len,
-+			   (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
- 
- 	if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
- 	    ((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
-@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- 	u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
- 	int offset;
- 
-+	if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) {
-+		ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+			   (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function |
- 	 *	prf
-@@ -837,11 +866,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
- 	 * if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field
- 	 */
- 	if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
-+		if (len < 2) {
-+			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+				   "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
-+			ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+			return NULL;
-+		}
- 		tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
- 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose "
- 			   "total length = %d", tot_len);
- 		if (tot_len > 15000)
- 			return NULL;
-+		if (data->inbuf) {
-+			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+				   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
-+			ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+			return NULL;
-+		}
- 		data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
- 		if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
- 			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer "
-@@ -927,6 +968,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
- 	/*
- 	 * we have output! Do we need to fragment it?
- 	 */
-+	lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch);
- 	len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf);
- 	if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) {
- 		resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu,
-diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-index 66bd5d2e9179..2bfc3c27647d 100644
---- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- 	BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
- 	EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
- 	int res = 0;
-+	size_t prime_len, order_len;
- 
- 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response");
- 
-+	prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
-+	order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
-+
-+	if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+			   (unsigned int) payload_len,
-+			   (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
-+
- 	if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
- 	    ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
- 	    ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- 	u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
- 	int offset;
- 
-+	if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+			   (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
-+
- 	/* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */
- 	grp = htons(data->group_num);
- 	ptr = (u8 *) &cs;
-@@ -923,11 +942,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
- 	 * the first fragment has a total length
- 	 */
- 	if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
-+		if (len < 2) {
-+			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+				   "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
-+			return;
-+		}
- 		tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
- 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total "
- 			   "length = %d", tot_len);
- 		if (tot_len > 15000)
- 			return;
-+		if (data->inbuf) {
-+			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+				   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
-+			return;
-+		}
- 		data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
- 		if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
- 			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to "
diff --git a/package/hostapd/hostapd.hash b/package/hostapd/hostapd.hash
index 3c7b63d..869849b 100644
--- a/package/hostapd/hostapd.hash
+++ b/package/hostapd/hostapd.hash
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 # Locally calculated
-sha256	6fe0eb6bd1c9cbd24952ece8586b6f7bd14ab358edfda99794e79b9b9dbd657f  hostapd-2.4.tar.gz
+sha256	8e272d954dc0d7026c264b79b15389ec2b2c555b32970de39f506b9f463ec74a  hostapd-2.5.tar.gz
diff --git a/package/hostapd/hostapd.mk b/package/hostapd/hostapd.mk
index 1ad32a2..e22e53f 100644
--- a/package/hostapd/hostapd.mk
+++ b/package/hostapd/hostapd.mk
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 #
 ################################################################################
 
-HOSTAPD_VERSION = 2.4
+HOSTAPD_VERSION = 2.5
 HOSTAPD_SITE = http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases
 HOSTAPD_SUBDIR = hostapd
 HOSTAPD_CONFIG = $(HOSTAPD_DIR)/$(HOSTAPD_SUBDIR)/.config


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