[Buildroot] [PATCH 1/2] libcroco: add upstream security fixes
Peter Korsgaard
peter at korsgaard.com
Tue Apr 25 14:16:59 UTC 2017
These have been added to upstream git after 0.6.12 was released.
CVE-2017-7960 - The cr_input_new_from_uri function in cr-input.c in libcroco
0.6.11 and 0.6.12 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service
(heap-based buffer over-read) via a crafted CSS file.
CVE-2017-7961 - The cr_tknzr_parse_rgb function in cr-tknzr.c in libcroco
0.6.11 and 0.6.12 has an "outside the range of representable values of type
long" undefined behavior issue, which might allow remote attackers to cause
a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other
impact via a crafted CSS file.
For more details, see:
https://blogs.gentoo.org/ago/2017/04/17/libcroco-heap-overflow-and-undefined-behavior/
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter at korsgaard.com>
---
...-check-end-of-input-before-reading-a-byte.patch | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++
...02-tknzr-support-only-max-long-rgb-values.patch | 46 ++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 108 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 package/libcroco/0001-input-check-end-of-input-before-reading-a-byte.patch
create mode 100644 package/libcroco/0002-tknzr-support-only-max-long-rgb-values.patch
diff --git a/package/libcroco/0001-input-check-end-of-input-before-reading-a-byte.patch b/package/libcroco/0001-input-check-end-of-input-before-reading-a-byte.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..831b1a745
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/libcroco/0001-input-check-end-of-input-before-reading-a-byte.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+From 898e3a8c8c0314d2e6b106809a8e3e93cf9d4394 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ignacio Casal Quinteiro <qignacio at amazon.com>
+Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2017 13:13:43 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] input: check end of input before reading a byte
+
+Fixes CVE-2017-7960
+
+When reading bytes we weren't check that the index wasn't
+out of bound and this could produce an invalid read which
+could deal to a security bug.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter at korsgaard.com>
+---
+ src/cr-input.c | 11 +++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/cr-input.c b/src/cr-input.c
+index 49000b1..3b63a88 100644
+--- a/src/cr-input.c
++++ b/src/cr-input.c
+@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ cr_input_new_from_uri (const gchar * a_file_uri, enum CREncoding a_enc)
+ *we should free buf here because it's own by CRInput.
+ *(see the last parameter of cr_input_new_from_buf().
+ */
+- buf = NULL ;
++ buf = NULL;
+ }
+
+ cleanup:
+@@ -404,6 +404,8 @@ cr_input_get_nb_bytes_left (CRInput const * a_this)
+ enum CRStatus
+ cr_input_read_byte (CRInput * a_this, guchar * a_byte)
+ {
++ gulong nb_bytes_left = 0;
++
+ g_return_val_if_fail (a_this && PRIVATE (a_this)
+ && a_byte, CR_BAD_PARAM_ERROR);
+
+@@ -413,6 +415,12 @@ cr_input_read_byte (CRInput * a_this, guchar * a_byte)
+ if (PRIVATE (a_this)->end_of_input == TRUE)
+ return CR_END_OF_INPUT_ERROR;
+
++ nb_bytes_left = cr_input_get_nb_bytes_left (a_this);
++
++ if (nb_bytes_left < 1) {
++ return CR_END_OF_INPUT_ERROR;
++ }
++
+ *a_byte = PRIVATE (a_this)->in_buf[PRIVATE (a_this)->next_byte_index];
+
+ if (PRIVATE (a_this)->nb_bytes -
+@@ -477,7 +485,6 @@ cr_input_read_char (CRInput * a_this, guint32 * a_char)
+ if (*a_char == '\n') {
+ PRIVATE (a_this)->end_of_line = TRUE;
+ }
+-
+ }
+
+ return status;
+--
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/package/libcroco/0002-tknzr-support-only-max-long-rgb-values.patch b/package/libcroco/0002-tknzr-support-only-max-long-rgb-values.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1a9bcd947
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/libcroco/0002-tknzr-support-only-max-long-rgb-values.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From 9ad72875e9f08e4c519ef63d44cdbd94aa9504f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ignacio Casal Quinteiro <qignacio at amazon.com>
+Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2017 13:56:09 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] tknzr: support only max long rgb values
+
+Fixes CVE-2017-7961
+
+This fixes a possible out of bound when reading rgbs which
+are longer than the support MAXLONG
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter at korsgaard.com>
+---
+ src/cr-tknzr.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/cr-tknzr.c b/src/cr-tknzr.c
+index 1a7cfeb..1548c35 100644
+--- a/src/cr-tknzr.c
++++ b/src/cr-tknzr.c
+@@ -1279,6 +1279,11 @@ cr_tknzr_parse_rgb (CRTknzr * a_this, CRRgb ** a_rgb)
+ status = cr_tknzr_parse_num (a_this, &num);
+ ENSURE_PARSING_COND ((status == CR_OK) && (num != NULL));
+
++ if (num->val > G_MAXLONG) {
++ status = CR_PARSING_ERROR;
++ goto error;
++ }
++
+ red = num->val;
+ cr_num_destroy (num);
+ num = NULL;
+@@ -1298,6 +1303,11 @@ cr_tknzr_parse_rgb (CRTknzr * a_this, CRRgb ** a_rgb)
+ status = cr_tknzr_parse_num (a_this, &num);
+ ENSURE_PARSING_COND ((status == CR_OK) && (num != NULL));
+
++ if (num->val > G_MAXLONG) {
++ status = CR_PARSING_ERROR;
++ goto error;
++ }
++
+ PEEK_BYTE (a_this, 1, &next_bytes[0]);
+ if (next_bytes[0] == '%') {
+ SKIP_CHARS (a_this, 1);
+--
+2.11.0
+
--
2.11.0
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